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INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND THE 
(HOPED-FOR) EFFECTS OF CANDOR AND 
INTEGRITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
PAUL HORWITZ* 
My contribution to this discussion of the ethics of legal scholarship begins 
with a confession that complicates my treatment of these questions.  It is a 
lengthy confession and may appear to be a digression.  But it seems to me both 
a necessary context for the rather simple recommendations I ultimately make 
here, and a potentially useful contribution to this conversation in itself. 
I am an institutional pluralist, both between and within institutions.1  
Different institutions—churches, “the press,” religious institutions, and others, 
including universities—have different functions, norms, and traditions.  They 
fill different roles in the architecture of civil society.  They draw on different 
purposes; make use of different forms of expertise and training; and add in 
different ways to public discourse and social structure.  Each contributes to a 
healthy, vibrant civil society.  They may even aid in working toward whatever 
it is that we call “justice.”  But they do so in different ways.  Each institution 
contributes best by serving its own particular calling, not by trying to do 
everything.  Universities do not exist to save souls; the information the press 
provides, and the means it uses to obtain it, are quite different from the kind of 
information provided by the academy and the means used to seek knowledge 
within that institution. 
These institutions and their practices are not fixed.  They change and adapt 
in response to both internal and external developments, including changes in 
both other institutions and the larger society.  Members of these institutions 
hold internal debates about their norms and practices and their proper function.  
Some of their roles, norms, and practices may change dramatically over time, 
albeit in a way that is influenced by their particular histories and traditions.  
Other aspects of these institutions may be treated as part of the unchanging core 
of what it means to be a particular institution. 
 
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  I thank the editors of the Marquette 
Law Review for their hard work and patience and for their efforts in putting on this Symposium.  I am 
especially grateful to Chad Oldfather and Carissa Byrne Hessick, the prime movers behind this 
Symposium.   
1. See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). 
 
HORWITZ 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:07 AM 
926 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:925 
Two related conditions ought to be true of this process of change.  First, 
these changes should belong primarily to the institutions themselves, drawing 
on their own norms, practices, traditions, and current debates.2  Of course the 
press (for example) is not immune from market forces, social changes, the 
effects of technological change, and so on.3  But changes in institutional 
practices and functions should come primarily as a result of considered internal 
debate, not dictation from external authorities. 
Second, these institutions need not—almost certainly should not—serve as 
exact replicas of general social institutions and liberal democratic norms.  They 
should resist the “logic of congruence,” the insistence that “the internal life and 
organization of associations [should] mirror liberal democratic principles and 
practices.”4  Every citizen has an equal right to speak in a liberal democratic 
society, and both the liberty and equality inherent in this right rest in part on the 
 
2. See Gail J. Hupper, Educational Ambivalence: The Rise of a Foreign-Student Doctorate in 
Law, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 319 (2015) (citing Yale Law School Introduces Innovative New 
Program—Ph.D. in Law, YALE L. SCH. (July 11, 2012), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/yale-law-
school-introduces-innovative-new-program-phd-law [https://perma.cc/SRB5-EZPS].  This suggests 
that institutions and their members ought to have some sense of their own history and traditions.  This 
is not always true, to say the least.  Institutions and their members, like the rest of society, seem to 
display an increasing ignorance of, or indifference toward, their own history, a lack of sound training 
and inculcation in their particular practices, and either ignorance of, or a positive contempt for, 
institutional tradition.  This is certainly true in legal education.  Some of that has to do with general 
developments that apply to various institutions.  Some of it is specific to legal education.  Law schools 
(Yale notwithstanding) train lawyers, not law professors, and are often focused on practical learning 
rather than conscious inculcation of their students in a tradition as such.  And, at least until recently, 
there was no guarantee that potential law professors would be steeped in any kind of legal academic 
tradition or canon.  Law professors went from law school to clerkship to a smidgeon of practice to 
teaching, with perhaps an LL.M. in a particular subject.  They were not required to read the legal and 
legal scholarly canon, to the extent that one exists, in its entirety, as graduate students in other fields 
in the humanities and social sciences generally do.  It is true that more law professors today emerge 
from fellowships and graduate programs, at least some of which promise to “give students a broad 
foundation in the canon of legal scholarship.”  Id.  For a general description of Yale’s doctorate in law, 
see Ph.D. Program, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/degree-programs/graduate-
programs/phd-program [https://perma.cc/W2TB-P5JY] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).  But doctoral 
programs in law, even if they actually deliver on such promises, are rare, and fellowships vary greatly 
in nature.  I have not found much evidence that fledgling law professors emerging from fellowship 
programs are much steeped in a legal scholarly canon or legal tradition qua American law professors, 
aside (perhaps) from having read some of the key texts in their own specialized area of work.  It is 
difficult to respect a tradition of which one is only vaguely aware. 
3. See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF 
BIG TECH (2017) (discussing changes in institutional journalism and the forces that helped bring them 
about). 
4. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM 
IN AMERICA 36 (1998). 
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notion that everyone is capable of contributing usefully to public discourse and 
equally entitled to do so.  In law, this view is reflected in, among other things, 
the general First Amendment doctrine holding that government cannot regulate 
speech in a way that discriminates on the basis of the identity of the speaker or 
the content of the speech.5  In our culture, as Michael Kagan has recently 
suggested, an emblem for this is Norman Rockwell’s poster Freedom of Speech, 
in which “a slightly rumpled man in working class clothing—he literally wears 
a blue collar—stands to speak at a crowded public meeting,” while “an older, 
gray-haired man in a black suit and tie looks up intently to listen.”6  Whatever 
their differences in education, class, or other matters—and we would certainly 
today insert other differences, such as race and gender—they are “both alike in 
dignity”7 and equally valued for their contribution to democratic discussion. 
It is common today to believe that “because we live in a democratic [and 
egalitarian] society, the institution[s] we inhabit should embody democratic 
[and egalitarian] principles.”8  Common, but wrong.  It is certainly wrong about 
the academy, which is a non-democratic, non-egalitarian institution.  Students 
do not (and should not) enjoy equal status with professors.  Professors 
themselves must prove their expertise and worth in order to be hired, to be 
promoted, and to earn prominence in their field.9  A doctorate in astronomy is 
only the beginning of the ability to call yourself an academic astronomer; now 
more than ever, a doctorate certainly will not lead inevitably to a position in the 
academy.  And that position is itself limited in scope: academic astronomers do 
not get a vote about who gets to become an academic sociologist.10  
 
5. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 47 n.4 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have repeatedly frowned on regulations that discriminate based 
on the content of the speech or the identity of the speaker.”). 
6. Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 765, 769 (2015). 
7. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act I, prologue. 
8. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 110 (2008) (describing but not 
endorsing this view). 
9. Of course, there is such a thing as unearned prominence.  In the short run, at least, and probably 
the long run too, academics—especially legal academics—often judge by professional credentials 
rather than intellectual worth, or at least pay disproportionate attention to the former.   
10. The same is true of other institutions.  A religious body may be egalitarian by choice, 
although even those bodies are rarely democratic: a church that follows the principle of sola scriptura 
may believe that each person is obligated to read and limn the Bible for him or herself, but it does not 
necessarily believe each reading is equally legitimate, or put the meaning of disputed Bible passages 
up for majority vote.  And in hierarchical churches, the laity do not have the same right to interpret and 
declare doctrine as the leadership, which itself is not necessarily selected by democratic or egalitarian 
means.  The laity and leadership of such a church can certainly contend over whether to change this 
norm, but this is strictly a matter of internal debate.  The law has no business dictating that hierarchical 
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So, at the broad level, institutions—some institutions, at least, and 
especially those, like universities, that fulfill valuable and particular social 
functions and operate according to long (if changing) tradition, norms, and 
practices—are varied and valuable.  Whether they would agree with this 
expressly or not, many members of such institutions, and members of the 
broader public, would have little trouble with this proposition.  More 
controversially, perhaps, I believe there is also room for pluralism within 
institutions: that is, that there is room for a diversity of values and approaches 
within particular institutions such as universities or the press.  Not all 
newspapers or magazines cover the same subjects in the same way, or have an 
identical sense of mission.  They may agree on certain fundamental norms or 
practices, such as not plagiarizing, or ensuring that sources are quoted 
accurately.  Beyond such general commonplace norms, however, they vary 
greatly.  By saying there is room for such intra-institutional pluralism, however, 
I am going a step beyond simply recognizing the fact of such differences.  I 
believe this intra-institutional pluralism is a good thing.11  
Within the legal academy, the usual focus of arguments on this subject is 
the role of religiously affiliated law schools.12  That focus artificially limits and 
distorts the discussion.  Other law schools focus on other specific missions as 
well: serving and advancing particular populations such as African-Americans, 
emphasizing particular fields (such as environmental law) or methodologies 
(such as law and economics), concentrating on training lawyers for a particular 
region (the many state schools—although this is truer in theory than in 
practice), or emphasizing particular goals and ideologies such as “social 
justice.”13  These different projects, focuses, and functions suggest different 
 
churches become Congregationalist entities, let alone liberal democratic ones, any more than it has the 
right to tell The New York Times to get rid of its executive editor and become “an autonomous 
collective” in which various staffers “take . . . turns to . . . act as a sort of executive-officer-for-the-
week.”  See Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python Pictures 1974). 
11. Cf. Paul Horwitz, Positive Pluralism Now, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1016–17 (2017) 
(reviewing JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP 
DIFFERENCE (2016)) [hereinafter Horwitz, Positive Pluralism] (arguing generally that pluralism is a 
good in itself, not simply a sociological fact); Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument 
for Accommodation of Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1302–05 (2016) (writing to similar 
effect). 
12. See, e.g., AALS Symposium on Institutional Pluralism: The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law 
Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125 (2009).  The subtitle in this example is hardly incidental.   
13. See, e.g., Gwynne Skinner, A Clinical Model for Bringing International Human Rights 
Home: Human Rights Reporting on Conditions of Immigrant Detention, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
649, 651 (2009) (describing “the arena of equal justice and social justice advocacy” as “central to the 
mission of Seattle University School of Law”).   
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ways of approaching the “academic” mission: different practices, norms, and 
rules. 
It is certainly possible to argue that some of these are simply not proper 
“academic” missions, and that whether these institutions are good or bad, to the 
extent that they pursue these goals they are not truly academic institutions.  
They may be condemned outright, or they may be judged by a different set of 
standards: by religious standards, for example, or social justice standards, but 
not conventional academic standards.  But, on this view, they should not be 
treated as genuine academic institutions as such.  I confess, albeit with some 
ambivalence, that this is not my own preference.  Part of the internal debate and 
slow change or evolution of institutions at the broad level, such as the press or 
universities, involves different practices and views held and practiced by 
different individual entities, such as individual newspapers or law schools.  
These are serious debates and practices about what it means to do academic 
work.  I do not think it is enough, or always accurate, to simply call some of 
these views “non-academic.”  “[C]ultivating differences” may be “a better thing 
for legal education” than forcing them into a narrow box.14  With more than 200 
law schools in the United States, there is room for that kind of diversity or 
pluralism within the legal academy as an institution. 
The problem with this sort of institutional pluralism—and not the only one, 
although I continue to avow it—is that it makes judgment and prescription on 
questions of the ethics of legal scholarship difficult if not impossible.  At the 
least, it renders such judgments “problematic,” to use the popular lingo of the 
day.  How is an ethics of legal scholarship possible if one believes the legal 
academy can be many things?  How can anything be forbidden if everything is 
permitted? 
I have two answers to this question.  Each may dissatisfy in its own way, 
although I worry about the first kind of dissatisfaction and rather enjoy the 
discomfiture that might result from the second answer. 
The first is potentially unstable but not necessarily paradoxical.  
Institutional pluralism is neither pure relativism nor indifference to the forms 
that institutional practices take.  More than one set of institutional practices or 
norms may fit under the general umbrella of a particular institution, and some 
degree of humility and deference is required when evaluating those potential 
paths.  One might acknowledge that a newspaper or church or university might 
take an approach that one does not favor oneself, but retain a sense of the limits 
of one’s own vision and withhold hasty judgment about it.  But it doesn’t 
 
14. John Garvey, Introduction, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125, 127 (2009). 
 
HORWITZ 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:07 AM 
930 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:925 
require one to believe that every practice or norm properly belongs under that 
umbrella—that everything is permitted. 
The limits I am interested in here, however broad or imperfectly 
understood, are internal institutional limits.15  One may believe that journalism 
is a sufficiently diverse institution to permit both openly partisan news organs 
and others that attempt to remain above or outside the political fray and to report 
as disinterestedly as possible, while believing that any kind of magazine or 
newspaper that deliberately lies or buries inconvenient facts is not engaged in 
“journalism,” but a different practice altogether, such as propaganda.  One can 
recognize that institutions change over time and that their practices are subject 
to contestation, and acknowledge the difficulties of fixing the point at which a 
practice or norm is unacceptable, while doing one’s best to derive from those 
institutions’ practices, norms, traditions, history, and development, some basis 
for, and sense of, the outer boundaries. 
To that extent, one can believe in pluralism within institutions while still 
believing that some practices fall outside even capacious boundaries, and that 
there is some common ground for all members of that institution.  An 
institutional ethics can be built on that ground.  I suspect it is built on that 
ground all the time.  Legal academics take a variety of approaches to 
scholarship, but not an endless variety, and nearly all of them agree that some 
practices are unethical.  And many or most legal academics, whether they 
would put the point in ethical terms or not, show a fair amount of dissatisfaction 
with many current practices—including some that they engage in themselves.  
Hence, this Symposium itself.  The number of legal academics who express a 
sense that something has gone wrong with the enterprise and that various 
practices—puffery, exaggerated claims of “novelty,” failure to give due 
attention to counter-arguments, abuse of history or precedent, and others—is 
substantial.  And it includes within its ranks legal academics who hold widely 
 
15. Although they are not my focus, there are also potential external limits to institutional 
pluralism.  These are Holmes’s “can’t helps”—our “deepest values . . . [that] live below thought and 
provide warrants for action even when we cannot give those values a compelling or perhaps any 
rational justification.”  Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom 
Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 447 (1992) (quoting 
Letter of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 
2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1124 (2d ed. 1953)).  One might insist, for example, that child sacrifice is 
an unacceptable practice for religious institutions.  One must be wary, however, of equating such moral 
“can’t helps” with normative conclusions about the nature and practices of institutions as such.  One 
can believe that a church cannot be allowed to practice child sacrifice without drawing any conclusions 
about whether such a church is still properly described as a church.  A law school that practiced child 
sacrifice, however, would be departing from both our external, moral commitments and any reasonable 
understanding of the current or historical institutional practices of the legal academy (at least so far as 
I am aware).  
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varied—in other words, plural—positions about the purpose and functions of 
the legal academy: those who favor normative work and those who deplore it, 
those who see legal scholarship as a form of legal and political advocacy and 
those who strongly disagree with that view, and many others.   
Moreover—and this is my second, perhaps more discomfiting answer to the 
question whether it is possible to believe in an ethics of legal scholarship despite 
being an institutional pluralist—belief in intra-institutional pluralism does not 
preclude taking one’s own stand on preferable institutional norms, practices, 
and traditions.  It does not prevent one from taking normative positions on the 
ethics of legal scholarship, in short.  This too may be a difficult position to 
occupy stably and confidently, but it’s hardly impossible.  My belief that there 
is more than one way for a law school or a legal scholar to function does not 
stop me from holding my own professional beliefs about better or worse, and 
more or less ethical, ways to function as a legal scholar. 
Put more strongly, despite my general belief in institutional pluralism, I 
remain compelled to argue for particular norms, practices, and approaches and 
against others.  I think there are indeed proper professional and ethical practices 
for legal academics, both in the classroom and in teaching and service.  Every 
day I read law review articles and abstracts—or read the abstracts and throw 
away the articles themselves, more in anger than in sorrow—that seem very 
different indeed from my sense of what those practices and norms should be.  I 
react similarly to many of the extra-academic writings by law professors that I 
encounter: the op-eds and pieces in Slate or The Atlantic, the twits16 and other 
social-media writings.  These writings routinely trade on the ostensible 
expertise, authority, and title of the writer while far exceeding the author’s 
actual expertise.  They display little of the care, nuance, and awareness of 
counter-arguments that characterize academically responsible work, even to the 
extent that the different length and format of these writings might easily permit.  
I see intelligent and talented people with legal academic positions doing what I 
think they should not do, and what I think they think (or know) they should not 
do either.  I have views and take public stands on these matters. 
Despite other areas of disagreement, my own view is similar to that of 
another contributor to this Symposium, Stanley Fish.  Academics—including 
legal academics—should do their own jobs.  That job is to do the work of an 
academic: not a social engineer, a party apparatchik, a paid or unpaid “amicus” 
to some petitioner or respondent, or an enlisted soldier in the culture wars.  
(Doing one’s academic work properly and with scholarly integrity is a form of 
 
16. I believe the proper word is “tweets,” not “twits,” but I much prefer and insist on my alternate 
version, which is more descriptively accurate.  I write this despite having and using a Twitter account 
myself, for which I am heartily sorry.  
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service in the culture wars, however.  Among other things, in hewing closely 
and truly to one’s narrow professional obligations, one builds institutional 
islands in which time and discourse proceed at a different pace and in a different 
way: an other-directed way, touched but not subsumed by the clash of ignorant 
armies, driven deeply by ostensibly urgent and present-oriented social and 
political concerns, that takes place outside those institutions.)  The job is not to 
seek justice or righteousness, but understanding, clarity, and the advancement 
of knowledge.  Ours is the job of “academicizing”: “[T]o detach [a topic] from 
the context of its real world urgency, where there is a vote to be taken or an 
agenda to be embraced, and insert it into a context of academic urgency, where 
there is an account to be offered or an analysis to be performed.”17 
How does one reconcile this with a sense of pluralism within institutions, a 
sense that there is more than one path or set of practices even within a single 
institution, like universities or law schools?  “Uneasily and unstably,” would be 
one short and blunt answer.  “Falsely” or “impossibly” would be another, as 
blunt but more accusatory.  On this view, to not only practice and avow a 
particular set of institutional practices, but argue for them and criticize others, 
is to take sides in the contest of academic visions.  In the end, all that talk of 
“institutional pluralism” is just havering or denial.  The first answer I think is 
unquestionably true, and I cannot deny that the second one may in the end be 
true as well. 
My own sense of the matter is different.  That difference matters at a day-
to-day or year-to-year level, although I reserve judgment about whether it 
ultimately distinguishes it from simply taking sides.  Part of the difference has 
to do with humility, or perhaps mere uncertainty, and with a sense of the 
possibility of valid alternative paths and practices.  Arguments about the 
impossibility of setting absolute borders around the “academic,” or about the 
permeability of those borders and the inevitability of politics, do not impress 
me much.  There is surely a difference between acknowledging these 
difficulties and viewing them as an excuse, or license, not to act as an ethical 
academic professional.18  Nor do arguments about the urgency of the present 
moment, which are more or less literally all the rage these days: what used to 
 
17. FISH, supra note 8, at 27. 
18. Cf. ALBERT CAMUS, The Absurd Man, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 66, 
67 (First Vintage International ed., Vintage International 1991) (1955) (“‘Everything is permitted’ does 
not mean that nothing is forbidden.”).  We are, in this Article and within our own institution of legal 
academia, at least one step removed from the philosophical, ethical, and existential complexities of 
such a proposition.  Within institutions, including the legal academy, and despite the wide variety of 
views about what constitutes the function of a legal academic, we do not think everything is permitted.  
At least in practice, even those who believe that it is difficult to define with precision the borders of 
what is permitted or forbidden within academic work still believe that some things are forbidden. 
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be called the argumentum ad Hitlerum and today might be called the 
argumentum ad Trumpum. 
But someone who thinks that a single institution, such as the press or the 
university, can (at least up to a point) contain under its umbrella more than one 
vision, more than one set of practices and norms, will be reluctant to reach a 
final and definitive judgment that there is one right way for academics to act.  
He may insist on borders and limits, but he will resist the urge to make them 
too detailed or confining.  Rather than reject those alternative visions and 
practices immediately and entirely, he may be interested in learning more about 
them, examining how they function, asking whether they have a place in the 
university, and wondering what ethics such practices might demand.  He may 
learn from some of these positions and even accept some of them.  He may also, 
to be sure, end up rejecting them, in whole or in part. 
Moreover, the institutional pluralist’s vision of certain vital institutions is 
that they are profoundly important but not unchanging—that they have, in fact, 
changed and developed (not “evolved,” at least insofar as that vastly overused 
word suggests a Whiggish notion of progress) repeatedly over the centuries.  
Awareness of that fact will place him somewhat, although certainly not entirely, 
outside the fray.  It will lead him to academicize even his notion of the academy 
itself.  This vision need not lead him to conclude that everything is permitted 
and nothing forbidden.  Institutional change is always as much a function of a 
larger process of history and tradition as it is of contemporary contestation.  
Whatever external factors and urgencies—political, cultural, economic, and so 
on—affect the process and the debate, the process also draws on decades or 
centuries of internal norms, traditions, and arguments. 
One may conclude that there are core functions beyond which some 
practices simply do not belong within a particular institution, such as the 
academy.  For that institution, some practices must be counted as unethical, 
unprofessional, or simply wrong.  But awareness that the institution and its 
norms and practices are part of a process of change over time may make the 
institutional pluralist leery of being too prescriptive too soon, or too broad in 
those prescriptions.  Institutionalists, and academics, operate in the present and 
participate in its struggles, as they must.  But they also operate—or should—on 
a different and much longer time scale.  The institutional pluralist’s sense of 
internal debates over norms and practices will have a touch of “Zhou Enlai 
time”19 to it.  I firmly believe that certain practices and norms are wrong for the 
 
19. See Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
59, 128 n.390 (2013) (discussing and noting the provenance of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s possibly 
apocryphal response to a question posed to him in 1972 about the effects of the French Revolution; 
Zhou said it was “too early to say”). 
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legal academy: that academicizing is our job, not pressing—in our capacity as 
academics, at least—for social or political change in a way that risks putting 
scholarship second, or writing with a political or ideological goal in mind.  But 
I also think it is too early to tell for sure. 
The result of this belief in institutional pluralism need not be that one 
withdraws altogether from disputes over these questions, any more than 
pluralistic views about the relationship between equality and religious liberty 
require one to disclaim any position on, say, the equal dignity of LGBTQ 
individuals or the moral or legal rightness of same-sex marriage.  On my blog 
and elsewhere, I have identified and criticized practices by other legal 
academics that I believe are worthy of criticism.  Nor, certainly, does my belief 
in institutional pluralism liberate me to violate my own sense of what 
constitutes ethical legal scholarship, on the grounds that I might be wrong in 
those views.  I continue to try—imperfectly, to be sure—to research and write 
in accordance with what I believe is the proper function of legal scholarship 
and the responsibilities, obligations, and constraints that go along with it.  In 
short, notwithstanding my belief that there are different possible practices and 
views concerning how to do legal scholarship, I attempt (again, imperfectly) to 
follow and advocate for what I think is the right way of doing things. 
But my belief in institutional pluralism does affect my sense of the goal of 
advocating for a particular vision of sound legal scholarship.  In the case of 
pluralism’s relationship to debates over LGBTQ equality and religious liberty, 
and to culture-war issues more generally, I have written that while it is difficult 
to describe why pluralism is a good in itself, as opposed to “a mere ‘claim of 
descriptive sociology’ to be managed,”20 there is a difference between treating 
some value (like liberty, or equality) as the master value, and thus treating 
pluralism as something to be accommodated only after the fact and only insofar 
as it is consistent with that master value, and “an approach that starts with 
pluralism as a positive feature of our society and treats liberty or equality as 
factors to be weighed and considered as means of helping pluralism itself 
flourish.”21  Something similar can be said about intra-institutional debates 
about what the university (or the press, or some other institution) is for, and 
how it should function.   
The difference can be felt in the heat and fierceness of our current cultural 
and political debates, the assurance with which they are pursued, and the 
eagerness of some of the disputants to insist, through the logic of congruence, 
 
20. Hortwitz, Positive Pluralism, supra note 11, at 1017 (citing JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, 
PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 27 (2015)). 
21. Id. 
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that their position not only win the public debate but that such victories be 
irreversibly entrenched through law, including constitutional law.  They insist 
on total, permanent victory.  Similarly, whatever their actual goals or purposes, 
conservative legislators and others who have pushed for an “Academic Bill of 
Rights,”22 or laws ensuring political diversity in faculty hiring,23 or other rules 
for the university, are not just arguing for a particular vision of academic 
ethics—one with which, on a number of points, I am fairly sympathetic.  They 
also insist that this vision be entrenched, and competing visions extirpated from 
the university.  I feel compelled both to practice and to argue for what I think 
is the proper function of the university and of (legal) academic ethics.  Because 
I begin from a vision of institutional pluralism, however, and because I think 
there is a fair amount of room for the contestation of competing visions of the 
university, I feel no compulsion to press urgently for total victory for my own 
vision—even if I think it’s the right vision. 
I am more than willing to argue firmly for what I think is the right approach 
and against other approaches.  If the vast majority of my colleagues in the legal 
academy adopted a different vision of legal scholarship or other legal academic 
rules and practices, or treated certain practices—puffery about the “novelty” of 
a law review article, for example—as a good thing or at least as no big deal, I 
would continue to argue against them and do my best to deny them a final 
victory.  But my interest is in preventing their final victory, not ensuring my 
own. 
This cautious approach is not absolute.  Some practices might be so far from 
what I think of as the core of the academic institution properly understood that 
I would fight without hesitation to cast them, and their practitioners, out of the 
academy.  In his book on academic freedom, Fish tells the story of Denis 
Rancourt, officially a physics professor at the University of Ottawa but really a 
political activist, who was ultimately removed from his job and prevented from 
teaching because he engaged in “what he call[ed] ‘academic squatting’—
turning a course with an advertised subject matter and syllabus into a workshop 
 
22. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers 
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1551–53 (2007). 
23. See, e.g., William Petroski & Brianne Pfannenstiel, Political Diversity Among Faculty Won’t 
be Required.  Here are Some Bills That Died in the 2017 Iowa Legislature, DES MOINES REG. (April 
25, 2017), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/22/political-diversity-
among-faculty-wont-required-here-some-bills-died-2017-iowa-legislature/99624024/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JC2-9BB3] (discussing a failed bill instituting a hiring freeze at Iowa’s public 
universities until rough parity was achieved between registered Republicans and registered Democrats 
on those universities’ faculties). 
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for revolutionary activity.”24  Rancourt’s dismissal was the right thing.  For the 
most part, however, I would allow competing visions and practices to continue, 
including many that I think are not consistent with the correct vision of 
academic functioning, while arguing against them.  If this is not broad or firm 
ground on which to stand, so be it. 
Again, this approach raises serious questions about, and difficulties in, 
making recommendations for a sound ethics of legal scholarship, including the 
suggested principles that my fellow Symposium participants and I have 
published here.25  Someone with the pluralist views I have described has a 
number of options.  She could decline to issue any recommendations, although 
I have argued that this is not required by my stance.  She could focus only on 
what she thinks are the core principles of ethical scholarly practice, leaving 
anything outside that small core for ongoing debate.  She could, conversely, 
issue prescriptions so broad as to be virtually meaningless, like a doctor 
recommending that a headache be treated by aspirin, acetaminophen, morphine, 
acupuncture, Chinese herbs, psychiatry, biofeedback, or meditation.26  Such a 
recommendation may be valid27 but is not terribly helpful.  Finally, she might 
confidently issue specific recommendations based on her own view of what 
constitutes sound ethics in legal scholarship, while adding the caveat that other 
prescriptions, even radically different ones, are not necessarily beyond the pale.  
This last approach is not so much a prescription or description as it is an 
argument, one that takes the implicit position that although it would be good on 
the whole if people complied with it, they need not do so. 
My approach here is closest to the second approach listed above.  I focus 
on two core values that arguably are essential to sound functioning for any 
academic.  These values are not only basic but fairly banal.  But their 
implications, if taken seriously—a big “if,” to be sure—are not. 
The two core values are candor and integrity.  By candor, I mean not just 
honesty and sincerity, but a willingness to exhibit the honesty and sincerity 
required to make a statement and its motives sufficiently transparent to be fully 
 
24. STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO 
REVOLUTION 14 (2014). 
25. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 897 (2018). 
26. See Headaches: Treatment Depends on your Diagnosis and Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/chronic-daily-headaches/in-depth/headaches/art-
20047375 [https://perma.cc/Y6DB-X93E] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (mentioning almost all of these 
treatments). 
27. I have my doubts about some of these treatments, and in keeping with some of my general 
complaints about the nature of professional ethics today, it is not clear that all of them are based on 
meaningful medical expertise. 
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understood by the recipient of the communication.28  It thus involves, as Micah 
Schwartzman has written, elements of both “sincerity and disclosure.”29  By 
integrity, I mean especially coherence between belief, word, and deed.  I follow 
roughly Stephen L. Carter’s definition of integrity, which has been summarized 
as requiring “(1) carefully reflecting on right and wrong in a particular context 
(a process he calls ‘discernment’); (2) acting on the outcome of this reflection; 
and (3) avowing the coherence between one’s reflection and conduct.”30  
In the context of the ethics of legal scholarship, what candor and integrity, 
taken together, demand are that the legal scholar: (1) reflect on her approach to 
legal scholarship, generally and/or in a particular case; (2) reflect on the 
implications of that approach; (3) reflect on her motives in engaging in a 
particular legal scholarly activity (an activity I define in certain circumstances, 
described below, to include things other than scholarly articles or books); (4) 
act consistently with those reflections; and (5) do so with enough transparency 
and openness that the reader can judge for himself the purpose of the argument 
being made and its authority or reliability. 
Candor and integrity, thus defined, are consistent with the fairly 
traditionalist, “deflationary,”31 “do your job” approach to legal scholarship.  
That argument is pursued elsewhere in the contributions to this Symposium.32  
I want to focus here on what these core values might mean for approaches to 
legal scholarship that depart, in whole or in part, from that conventional model. 
These include approaches to legal scholarship that view our task as that of 
rendering expert advice to judges and other lawmakers, with the goal of 
advancing the “right solution of . . . social problems.”33  They also include those 
academics who may confuse their job or function with their personal virtues, 
 
28. See Candor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 828 (2d ed. 1989).  Much of this is inherent in 
the fifth definition of “candor” in the Oxford English Dictionary: “Freedom from reserve in one’s 
statements; openness, frankness, ingenuousness, outspokenness.”  Id.  For my purposes, freedom from 
reserve, openness, and ingenuousness are the key concepts.   
29. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 994 (2008). 
30. Martin Benjamin, Book Review, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 180, 180 (1997) 
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY (1996)). 
31. FISH, supra note 24, at 20.  
32. See, e.g., Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The Truth of the Matter: Why the Social Contract Dictates 
Legal Scholars’ Sincerity, Candor & Thoroughness, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1063 (2018); Neil Hamilton, 
Legal Scholars’ Ethical Responsibilities Concerning Neutrality and Objectivity, Candor and 
Exhaustiveness, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1045 (2018). 
33. FISH, supra note 25, at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting AAUP, 1915 DECLARATION OF 
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915)); accord ROBERT C. POST, 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
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extolling themselves as fearless truth-tellers and superb critical thinkers 
possessed of a unique wisdom that tempts, if not entitles, them to pronounce on 
a wide range of issues, not as citizens but as academics, always with their 
academic titles displayed prominently.34 
Not least, these approaches include the view of those legal scholars who 
assert that “[t]he legal scholar’s rightful aim is not simply to speak the 
truth . . . .  It is to speak the truth to power.”35  The ideal legal academy, in this 
view, is “an ethical community of scholars and activists committed to 
combating injustice.”36  On this view, the job of the legal scholar is not to 
academicize politically controversial questions, but to use academic work to 
wage politics, identifying and attacking injustice and securing vital legal and 
political victories.  The injustice may involve racial or other forms of inequality, 
the subordination of the disenfranchised and powerless, the growth of big 
government, the spread of legal abortion or threats to reproductive rights, and 
so on.  The cause served may be libertarianism, values conservatism, 
progressivism, leftism, or what have you.  In the legal academy the cause is 
more likely to lean left than right, and more likely to lean toward a fairly 
bourgeois version of progressivism than a radical political revolutionary 
program; but it certainly can and does include conservatives or libertarians of 
various stripes.  Whatever the cause, the goal is its achievement, not just its 
academic study. 
For various reasons, in the legal academy this often means that the legal 
academic becomes a scholar-activist, a scholar-advocate, or a “public” legal 
academic, one whose arguments are advanced not only through conventional 
legal scholarship, but through op-eds, amicus briefs, scholars’ letters, twits37 
and blog posts and other uses of social media, and other tools in the apparatus 
of public political discourse and advocacy.  Importantly, these activities are 
undertaken as a legal academic and under the auspices of one’s legal academic 
title and ostensible authority.  Using—I would say trading on—one’s title and 
ostensible authority or expertise as a legal academic is an essential part of this 
 
34. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 24, at 11–12, 50–51, 95–96.  There is some relationship between 
this conception and Fish’s description of “academic exceptionalism.”  Id. at 74.  It is also connected to 
Fish’s description of the “[a]cademic freedom as critique” school, which he describes thus: “If 
academics have the special capacity to see through the conventional public wisdom and expose its 
contradictions, exercising that capacity is, when it comes down to it, the academic’s real job; critique—
of everything—is the continuing obligation.”  Id. at 12. 
35. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2347 (1999). 
36. Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Expanding Directions, Exploding Parameters: 
Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 787, 788 (2000). 
37. Again, one may read that word as “tweets” here. 
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form of activity.  A blog consisting of posts critical of the Trump administration 
that is authored by various American citizens or residents, many of whom 
happen to hold law degrees or positions in the legal academy, is one thing.  It 
may get some attention and might convince some readers by virtue of the 
strength of its arguments, but does not seek to bludgeon its readers with 
(sometimes questionable) authority.  A blog with the same posts that trumpets 
that its “contributors include many preeminent legal authorities, as well as 
rising stars within the profession,” all of whom “stand united in their desire to 
protect and defend the rule of law in America,” is quite another.38  
How would the twin values of candor and integrity affect these common 
alternate approaches to legal scholarship?  As I have suggested, I do not favor 
these alternate approaches, but neither am I willing to argue strongly for their 
elimination, or for their being cast out from the general category of “academic” 
work or “scholarship.”  But it is possible to imagine what a scholar following 
one of these paths would write, and how he would act, if he were committed to 
acting with candor and integrity.  The result, I think, would be a commendable 
gain in the ability of readers to judge this sort of scholarship better, and an 
equally commendable deflation of the ostensible academic “authority” of this 
approach to scholarship or public advocacy. 
Imagine, for instance, a law review article written by a legal scholar who 
believes that her job requires her to use her expertise for the purpose of social 
betterment, to advance the cause of finding the “right solution of social 
problems”—to serve, in short, as a kind of roving, one-woman law reform 
commission, recommending fixes to statutes, changes in existing law and 
policy, or better judicial doctrine in a particular area.  This is, of course, a very 
common approach to legal scholarship—perhaps the dominant mode.39  The 
law review article in this common mode always culminates in what Pierre 
 
38. Announcing Take Care, TAKE CARE BLOG (Mar. 16, 2017),  
https://takecareblog.com/blog/announcing-take-care [https://perma.cc/22DU-LZGT]; see also Orin 
Kerr, New Legal Blog, Take Care, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/16/new-legal-blog-take-
care/?utm_term=.554f68e4673d [http://perma.cc/537J-H296] (“The list of bloggers is long and 
impressive, consisting mostly of prominent liberal constitutional law professors.”).  It is worth noting 
that although the early announcements from and about the blog, and the early versions of its “About 
Us” page, were vigorous in promoting the impressive credentials of its contributors, in terms not too 
different from a marriage between the US News & World Report law school rankings and US magazine, 
the current version of the “About Us” page has eliminated the gross credentialism that used to appear 
there.  See About Us, TAKE CARE BLOG, https://takecareblog.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/VZJ2-
CMGH] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
39. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 808 
(1991) [hereinafter Schlag, Normativity]. 
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Schlag calls “the law review equivalent of the prayer for relief—namely, the 
normative prescription, the ‘And therefore the court should or the legislature 
should or we should or the zeitgeist should’” section.40  This is the approach 
that always figured in the advice of my late friend Dan Markel, who was among 
other things a canny thinker about the mechanics of legal scholarship and 
placement and who, for both sincere and strategic reasons, frequently reacted 
to friends’ article drafts by asking, “What’s the normative payoff?” 
This is not a necessary format.  There is nothing wrong with a legal 
academic asking questions she cannot answer, or describing a problem without 
offering any solutions.  But it is a common format.  That is understandable, 
given that lawyers are trained to be problem-solvers.  It may also have 
something to do with how law professors are produced.  Harvard Law School, 
for instance, still generates a large number of future law professors, many of 
whom serve on the Harvard Law Review.  There, they are trained to write case 
comments that, with awful regularity, follow the same format: (1) 
Courts/legislatures/officials/society are dealing with problem X; (2) In Jones v. 
Smith, the federal appellate court (or, occasionally, a state court, legislature, or 
administrative agency) held that Y; (3) Although the actor [insert mild flattery 
here], its opinion [insert criticism here]; (4) If the court had instead held Z, we 
would have been much better off.  Having absorbed this format and repeated it 
mutatis mutandis as a federal law clerk, and given the conservatism, cynicism, 
or path-dependence of the legal academic profession and of the prospective 
academic’s mentors in the job-seeking process, the budding scholar will rinse 
and repeat, perhaps not indefinitely (several legal scholars have told me they 
abandon this approach at least once they have won tenure), but certainly ad 
nauseam. 
To repeat, this is not the only available approach.41  But it is probably the 
most common, and it is repeated and perpetuated, in slightly more sophisticated 
versions, through at least the job-hunting and tenure-seeking stages of the 
 
40. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing (A Report on 
the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 813 (2009) [hereinafter Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence]; see also 
Shari Motro, Scholarship Against Desire, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115, 116 (2015) (suggesting that 
law professors are taken more seriously if they follow a scholarly model that “ask[s] questions [they 
can] solve rather than ones that merely invite[ ] a conversation”). 
41. Yale Law School, for example, is another common breeding ground for law professors.  Its 
major credentializing organization, the Yale Law Journal, does not invariably follow this format for its 
student pieces, which are more often notes than case comments.  (The Harvard Law Review also 
publishes notes, and not all its notes follow the mechanical approach of its case comments.  But many 
do.)  Although many of its student notes culminate in the standard prayer for relief, they do not 
invariably do so, and they certainly do not follow a recognizable, mechanical, standard format.  Some 
might suggest that they do not follow a recognizable anything.   
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typical legal academic career.  The problems may get bigger, and the tools and 
methods brought to bear on studying and solving them more varied and less 
doctrinal, but they still usually culminate in a “prayer for relief.” 
Because this approach is so common, the applicable ethical norms are fairly 
standard and well known, and need not be rehearsed much here.  At its best, or 
even at the average level, scholarship of this sort meets most of the 
requirements of candor and integrity.  The scholar is expected to write in her 
area of expertise.  The problem discussed is expected to be addressed fully and 
fairly.  The costs and benefits of the proposed solution are supposed to be 
canvassed, and an argument made for why the fix is worthwhile.42  Existing and 
potential criticisms and counter-arguments are supposed to be examined.  All 
this is standard fare. 
Given that all this is quite well-known, I am not suggesting that this rather 
mechanical, reformist format of legal scholarship displays a general failure or 
absence of candor and integrity, or that a renewed emphasis on those values 
would require radical change.  But there are certainly always cases in which 
such articles fall short by the measure of candor and integrity, and would look 
different if they lived up to it better. 
One of the most obvious ways in which such articles could be improved is 
by clearly stating their animating premises.  If Z is a better solution than Y, it 
must be because it does a better job of satisfying some set of desiderata: 
equality, liberty, efficiency, autonomy—even, at an absurdly general level, 
“justice.”  Even if some criteria are given, they are often given at a lower level 
of generality than that: Z is better than Y because it provides greater access to 
abortion rights, or fewer class certifications, or something else.  To say the least, 
it would help evaluate such scholarship if the author is explicit about his or her 
criteria or animating values, and either attempts to justify them or at least states 
them bluntly and makes clear that he will make no effort to justify them.  In the 
latter case, especially, it would help ensure that readers who reject those 
premises or values are not taken in and/or do not waste more time than is 
necessary reading the article.   
Another way in which such articles could display greater candor and 
integrity would be to be clearer about what we might call the author’s endgame.  
It is fairly common for prescriptive articles of this sort—the Court should rule 
this way in a forthcoming case; the policy actor should take that approach to a 
 
42. It is probably true, however, that much legal scholarship does not address sufficiently the 
transition costs involved in legal change.  See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal 
Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002) (discussing the costs of transitioning from one legal norm or 
rule to a new one and urging that those costs be taken into account when considering whether a change, 
even one that seems substantively preferable, is worthwhile).   
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problem—to be deliberately modest and narrow in their scope.  Sometimes—
often, one hopes—this is a result of sound scholarship.  If you are limited in 
your expertise or powers of prediction, or focused narrowly on a particular 
problem, it makes sense to confine your work to the problem at hand. 
Sometimes, however, it seems clear that this is a strategic choice.  The 
author has a much more sweeping end in mind, and knows it, and knows that 
the proposal offered is meant to push legal actors in the direction of that 
change—perhaps even to attempt to make that final step inevitable and 
unavoidable.  If your goal is, say, to reduce the legal effect of the Establishment 
Clause to a bare minimum and allow government to come as close to theocracy 
as possible, you are probably better off not saying so off the bat.  These kinds 
of statements tend to put readers on their guard.  Better to dismantle the wall 
one brick at a time, disclaiming any wider implications in each case, until you 
have reached a logical tipping point. 
Again, there is more than one reason to employ a common caveat like, “This 
article is not intended to address the following question,” or “I bracket the 
important question of X.”  It can be offered in good faith, out of modesty or 
care.  But it can also be a deliberate attempt to conceal: to hide one’s hand, to 
avoid frightening the reader or inducing her to ask broader skeptical questions, 
to lead her down the garden path while doing your best to obscure the intended 
final destination.  That may be a sound strategic choice in litigation.  But 
scholarship is not litigation, and such an approach lacks genuine candor or 
integrity.  The scholar who takes this approach knows that debate, criticism, 
and resistance to her proposals would increase if she made clear where she 
intends the line of argument to go.  Her goal is precisely to avoid that kind of 
criticism, skepticism, and strong resistance.  It is to seduce by degrees.  I am 
not objecting to scholars having such an endpoint in mind.  But they should say 
so, and accept the consequences of saying so.   
Another common—and increasing—failure of candor and integrity in this 
format of scholarship, in my opinion, is as closely related to professional 
ambition as it is to any sort of political goals.  That is the failure or 
unwillingness to tease out, or even acknowledge, the varied implications of a 
proposed solution.  I have seen this approach more often in recent years in job 
talks, including talks presenting highly polished and already “well-placed” 
papers.  It is evident both in the text of the article and in the answers to questions 
during the job talk.  Job candidates, it would appear, want simultaneously to be 
able to boast of the substantial implications of their thesis or normative 
conclusion and to deny them as necessary.  This desire is related to the job-
seeker’s professional goals and concerns.  He wants to please politically 
sympathetic allies on the faculty without causing any worry about potential 
politically “negative” consequences made possible by the argument, and to 
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avoid causing offense to potential political opponents on the faculty by boasting 
too openly of the sweeping nature of the changes his argument might require. 
A writer may, for instance, argue that courts should employ strict scrutiny 
in reviewing a new category of claims.  She may argue early in the article—
especially in the abstract and introduction, the material most likely to be read 
by law review editors and busy hiring faculty alike—that such an approach will 
have “sweeping implications” for the area.  Or she may ground her proposal for 
strict scrutiny on a broad set of arguments suggesting that judges should use 
strict scrutiny much more widely in constitutional review, again flagging early 
on the “important and novel implications” of such an argument.  When asked 
sympathetically about the implications of such an approach for a neighboring 
area in which the presenter knows the questioner would love strict scrutiny to 
be adopted, the author will muse enthusiastically about the possibilities for its 
application there.  When asked a similar question about an area—say, 
admissions policies at public universities—that the author knows is politically 
sensitive, or where a substantial number of the faculty would object to strict 
scrutiny, or where her implicit suggestion of a sympathetic political orientation 
will be muddied, she will answer that she hasn’t thought closely about that 
question yet, or that it is outside the scope of her article, and will pivot as 
quickly as possible to some other, less controversial issue or question. 
Of course, in one sense this is simply bad scholarship.  It may be honest bad 
scholarship; maybe the scholar really hasn’t thought enough about the 
implications of her arguments.  If hiring faculties and law review editors were 
angels, this bad scholarship would be judged as such.  Of course, they are not.  
Regardless of the reaction, though, the approach itself, at least when it is 
deliberate and strategic, is wrong in itself.  Normative scholarship that exhibits 
candor and integrity, and that wants to argue that its recommendations are 
valuable because of their sweeping implications, will not hesitate to enumerate 
all of those implications, including the ones that will run directly contrary to 
her own priors or the perceived priors of her audience.  If the author doesn’t 
like those implications, or knows they are bound to offend more readers than 
she would like, she can either find and present sound reasons why the logic of 
her position does not extend to those implications, or write a different—and 
probably less “sweeping” or “revolutionary,” and thus for some readers less 
impressive—paper. 
One can imagine similar implications of candor and integrity for the scholar 
who imagines that his job is to “speak truth to power,” or engage in that trendy 
academic phrase, “critical thinking,” or both.  In my view, speaking truth to 
power is a political goal, not an academic one.  Speaking truth is an academic 
goal.  Peter Finley Dunne famously wrote that “the job of the newspaper is to 
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comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable.”43  Some legal scholars insist 
that this is their job too,44 but I think they are wrong.45  The scholar’s job is 
neither to comfort nor afflict, nor to be concerned overmuch with the identity 
of those who happen to be comforted or afflicted by some piece of scholarship.  
Comforting the afflicted is among the worthiest and highest activities one can 
undertake in life.  But it is a different undertaking—as different from 
scholarship (including legal scholarship) as bandaging a wound at a 
neighborhood medical clinic is from doing pure research into the incidence of 
infections from wounds.  There is something to be said for afflicting the 
comfortable too.  I rather hope some of my scholarship achieves that result, and 
I confess that I’m pleased when the comfortable parties who are afflicted by my 
work are my fellow academics.  But that should be incidental. 
Again, that is my understanding of scholarship: its goals, its norms, its 
proper practices and ethics.  I am happy to argue against those who see their 
work as “speaking truth to power”—largely because I think it misunderstands 
the purposes of academic work, but not least because the phrase is so rarely 
used with real accuracy or honesty.  But I am not seeking to oust from the 
academic profession those who think otherwise.  What I would recommend is 
that if they are intent on pursuing this goal, they do so candidly and with 
integrity.  One can state one’s goal clearly and explain how it applies to and 
affects a particular piece of scholarship.  One can admit up front that one is 
ignoring counter-arguments or logical implications of one’s work because they 
might discomfit the “afflicted”—or, perhaps more accurately, because a 
complete treatment of that argument might discomfit other (comfortable) 
academics who believe one should never discomfit the afflicted.  One can, in 
short, be explicit about what one is doing as a scholar and why, and how that 
affects the arguments and observations that are being made—and those that are 
being ignored or omitted.  If the work is being undertaken on behalf of or 
subsidized by a particular interest group, one can say so.  One can ask oneself 
what it means to do such work with integrity, and act accordingly. 
The primary effect of carrying out work of this kind with candor and 
integrity is that it gives the reader a yardstick with which to judge its usefulness 
 
43. For the proper quote, see David Shedden, Today in Media History: Mr. Dooley: ‘The Job of 
the Newspaper is to Comfort the Afflicted and Afflict the Comfortable’, POYNTER (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.poynter.org/news/today-media-history-mr-dooley-job-newspaper-comfort-afflicted-and-
afflict-comfortable [https://perma.cc/D323-4Z8S].  I have paraphrased it to omit the homespun dialect 
of Dunne’s fictional character, Mr. Dooley. 
44. See, e.g., Glenn Omatsu, Teaching for Social Change: Learning How to Afflict the 
Comfortable and Comfort the Afflicted, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791–92 (1999). 
45. I think it is wrong for journalism as well, for that matter, and I did practice briefly in that 
field, for what it’s worth. 
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and reliability.  If you believe your mission as a scholar requires you to speak 
truth only “to power,” and to ignore important “truths” that might discomfit the 
powerless or afflicted—if, in short, you believe that your truth-seeking mission 
as an academic is limited and constrained not by expertise but by political 
imperatives—you should say so.  The reader then knows that she is not getting 
the full story.  She may, indeed, become interested in what you have identified 
as omissions from that story.  She may then explore those omissions in her own 
work.  If your work recommends a particular law reform, and is aimed at 
legislators and their staffers, they will know that they are getting a one-sided 
treatment of the issue.  They too may want to explore the potential implications 
that you have said explicitly exist but won’t be discussed.  At least if she is to 
be a scholar of integrity, the legal scholar who wants to “comfort the afflicted” 
must be willing, by being clear about her intentions and how they constrain her 
work, to undermine her own goal.  She may even be required, by pointing 
candidly to the issues she will not talk about and thus piquing the interest of her 
political opposites, to offer hostages to fortune. 
All of the categories of legal academic I have discussed so far are common.  
But more common still is the scholar-advocate or “public” (the current trendy 
phrase is “engaged”) legal academic.46  For our purposes, this passage does a 
fair job of summarizing this approach to legal scholarship: 
[I]t is the purpose of the scholarship that is key to engagement. 
‘[L]egal scholarship, in whatever form,’ must have as ‘its 
object influencing the direction of the law—ideally by moving 
judges, lawyers, legislators, and bureaucrats to rethink or 
reconsider a particular problem.’  The goal of engaged 
scholarship is to influence or shape the law itself, rather than 
comment on its status.47 
The law reviews overflow with this kind of legal scholarship.  Elsewhere in 
this Symposium, one can find references to recent debates over whether and 
when legal scholars should write or sign amicus briefs.48  But virtually every 
 
46. For a discussion of various definitions and forms of “engaged” legal scholarship and useful 
citations, see Sonia K. Katyal, Encouraging Engaged Scholarship: Perspectives From an Associate 
Dean for Research, 31 TOURO L. REV. 53, 57–58 (2014). 
47. David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: 
Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 761, 765 (2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal 
Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEX. L. REV. 321, 327 
(1999)). 
48. Transcript—Conference on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1083 
(2018); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 223, 233 & n.21 (2012) (raising doubts about the practice of filing scholars’ 
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legal academic knows, and quite a few are happy to say, that scholars’ amicus 
briefs are only one part of a larger practice that begins not with arguably 
extracurricular activity, but with scholarship itself.  A recent article in the 
Journal of Legal Education by an openly “engaged” legal scholar counsels: “Do 
something that matters.  Then write about it.  Write an amicus brief; turn it into 
a law  review article.  Draft legislation; turn it into a law review article.”49  
Much of the time, for many current legal scholars, the order is reversed: Write 
a law review article; then turn it into an amicus brief. 
Even that is an incomplete description.  These scholars go a step further: 
Their law review articles are amicus briefs.50  They are written with the goal of 
convincing judges or other decision-makers to reach a particular decision in a 
specific case or on a specific topic of current legal and political debate.  Often, 
the goal is not so much to reach the judge directly as to reach his or her law 
clerks: to provide the arguments or rationales (or rationalizations) the clerk 
might use in drafting the opinion for the judge, and to drape them in the cloak 
of “authority” by giving the clerk something to cite.  Or the goal is a larger 
strategic one of using scholarship, along with writing and action on other fronts, 
to move an argument from “off the wall” to “on the wall,”51 to give it sufficient 
momentum and plausibility that the argument becomes “in play” in public and 
legal discussion.  A key part of such strategies is using or trading on scholarly 
authority: “[T]rying, through [one’s] own gravitas as a noted constitutional 
scholar, to convince people that [a relatively novel] argument is not 
frivolous.”52 
This is not new, to be sure.  Pierre Schlag has observed for years that this 
is the standard format of normative legal scholarship.53  I do not know if it is 
even increasingly common.  But it is increasingly noteworthy, for two reasons.  
 
amicus briefs); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs: A Response to Richard Fallon, 16 
GREEN BAG 2d 135 (2013) (defending the practice).  For a brief but thoughtful discussion of these 
issues, see Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal 
Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1264–64 (2015).   
49. Nancy D. Polikoff, How Does a Radical Lesbian Feminist Who Just Knows How to Holler 
Somehow Become a Noted Legal Scholar?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 493, 496 (2017). 
50. See, e.g., A Dialogue With Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2012) (comments of Judge Frank Easterbrook) (“I’m not as enthusiastic 
about law review articles as Judge Sutton because many law review articles are just amicus briefs 
published under another name . . . .”). 
51. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 
TULSA L. REV. 553, 567–68 (2003). 
52. Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325, 331 (2013) 
(discussing the use of “constitutional persuasion on related fronts: legal and populist”). 
53. See, e.g., Schlag, Normativity, supra note 39, at 808; Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, supra 
note 40, at 813. 
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The first can be described in terms of the sociology of the legal academy.  
Normatively oriented law review articles were the standard form of legal 
scholarship for decades.  Eventually, this model came under pressure as a result 
of the entry into the field of larger numbers of legal scholars who were not pure 
doctrinalists with years of legal practice behind them, but were using various 
tools from other disciplines (in which they often had doctorates) and at least 
aspiring to a more “scholarly” model of legal academic work.  That many 
scholars have returned, more or less openly or covertly, to a model that is not 
only normative but fairly openly political or partisan is all the more striking in 
light of these changes in the population of the legal academy. 
The other reason the “disguised amicus brief” model of legal scholarship is 
so noteworthy today is that it has expanded and metastasized, taking advantage 
of a variety of social and other media.  One need not choose between a law 
review article and an amicus brief, or limit oneself to just those two forms of 
legal writing.  In fact, doing so is poor strategy.  The scholar-advocate or public 
legal scholar today wages a simultaneous multi-front war.  A piece of advocacy 
or argument will appear in a law review article.  The scholar will attempt to 
advance, normalize, or give momentum to that argument by packaging it online 
as an op-ed in a major newspaper like The New York Times, or a piece in Slate 
or The Atlantic or some other watering-hole for the professional-managerial 
class.  He will propagate that piece through Twitter and repackage it as a series 
of blog posts.  He will work with advocacy groups to give it still wider exposure 
and do their collective best to make it a talking point in public and political 
debate.54  He may organize panels and conferences to give further exposure to 
 
54. Traditionally, those advocacy groups were extramural: Groups like the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund or Alliance for Justice were more or less independent groups that resided outside the 
university walls.  Today, many ostensibly academic “centers” within law schools are either explicitly 
political in their missions or purport to study a particular subject, such as reproductive rights, but seem 
only to hire fellows and scholars and advance projects that take a specific position on those issues.  
They are often funded by individuals or groups whose other arms or funding activities are open in 
pursuing particular goals and outcomes.  These centers, and the effects of this sort of funding, have 
received much less attention than criticisms of corporate-funded legal research.  When these broader 
funding projects are criticized, it is generally politically conservative rather than politically liberal or 
progressive projects that receive most of the attention and criticism.  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The 
Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 76 (2006) (discussing Exxon’s funding of 
scholarly studies on punitive damages); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in 
Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1891–
95 (2008) (describing a “shrill and relentless campaign” against corporate liability, punitive damages, 
and class actions by “libertarians, economic conservatives, business interests, and the Republican 
party,” in which “[f]unding gushed from corporations, business associations, wealthy individual 
donors, and right-wing foundations to support literally dozens of think tanks, litigation centers, and 
university programs while underwriting a proliferating range of publications, conferences, and 
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the argument and transform it into a real or seeming movement.  And he will 
certainly also attempt to advance the argument through amicus briefs—either 
“scholars’ briefs” or briefs written on behalf of some willing group—and 
“scholars’ letters.” 
Like tech company enthusiasts and TED talk gurus, law professors working 
in this vein effectively embrace the idea that all this work is essentially the 
same, tailored and spread through a variety of “platforms.”55  It is unsurprising 
that Erwin Chemerinsky—who can surely be described accurately and fairly as 
a highly successful multi-platform scholar-activist—could have written, before 
the full onslaught of social media, that 
I find it hard to explain why an amicus brief containing lengthy 
and original analysis of a legal issue does not count as 
scholarship, but that same brief repackaged and published as a 
law review article is deemed scholarship. . . . If writing for 
judges can count as scholarship, why not an amicus brief 
directed at a particular court?56 
Nor is it surprising to read Sonia Katyal, arguing more recently on behalf of 
“engaged scholarship,” asserting that embracing different approaches to and 
platforms for one’s work can “maximize the real life impact that legal 
scholarship can have on current issues.”57 
I confess that the more of this sort of activity I see—and there is no shortage 
of it, especially in an age of political polarization, renewed culture wars, and 
“#resistance”—the more disturbed and dispirited I am by it.  Even an 
institutional pluralist has his can’t-helps, and this sort of multi-platform 
advocacy-scholarship pushes all my buttons.  Much of my reaction has to do 
with the obviousness of what is going on.  When combined with a simultaneous 
public refusal to say what is going on and an unrepentant and incomplete private 
 
individual fellowships and grants”); Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory 
After the Right’s Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1250 (2007) (describing a “right-wing” strategy in 
which “wealthy individual and corporate donors have directed funding to legal scholars who deploy 
Law and Economics arguments against disability rights and benefits”).  Academic study and 
discussion, let alone criticism, of coordination and collaboration between liberal or progressive centers 
within law schools, advocacy groups outside law schools, and foundations or individuals that fund 
both, is virtually non-existent and generally comes from conservatives, and is thus more likely to be 
ignored by those progressives who pay more attention to their allies than their adversaries.  Apparently, 
the behavior itself is uninteresting and unworthy of concern—just the question of which “side” is 
engaging in it.  It deserves much more study and criticism (or defense) than that.  
55. See generally Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to Transform 
Law, 105 KY. L. REV. 413 (2016–2017).  Steinberg’s article is about legal and political activism 
generally, not the use of social media platform by politically active legal academics in particular.  Id. 
56. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 892 (2009). 
57. Katyal, supra note 46, at 60. 
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admission that it is going on,58 it both exhibits and evokes a tremendous sense 
of cynicism about both politics and scholarship.59  As something of an idealist 
about both fields of human activity, and especially scholarship, which for me is 
a vocation, I deplore that cynicism and its effects.  And this kind of activity 
routinely involves actions that, in my view, subtly harm both scholarship and 
public advocacy, and thus the health of both scholarly and public discourse. 
A recent example illustrates what I mean.60  In a 2017 op-ed in The New 
York Times, Professor Martin Redish argued that President Trump could not, 
consistent with the constitutional law of due process, properly pardon former 
sheriff Joe Arpaio.61  (The president proceeded to do just that almost 
immediately after the op-ed was published.)  In that op-ed, Redish wrote, 
refreshingly, “I admit that this is a novel theory.  There’s no Supreme Court 
decision, at least that I know of, that deals specifically with the extent to which 
the president may employ his pardon power in [a way that arguably violates 
due process principles].”62  A day later, on Slate, my friends and First 
Amendment colleagues Micah Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe published a 
piece titled, “Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional.”63  A key 
paragraph in that piece asserted: 
 
58. I say “incomplete” because its practitioners, in conversation, will cheerfully admit to much 
of this, while offering various sincere or cynical defenses (or both).  But there are some things they 
will not admit about it even in private, either to others or, perhaps, to themselves. 
59. One example that again increased my capacity for cynicism about legal scholarship, although 
perhaps I should not have been so naïve, came in a scholar’s presentation I heard a while back.  The 
author prefaced his talk by announcing that he had met Justice Anthony Kennedy and thought he was 
susceptible to persuasion, and had written the piece to flatter Kennedy, to cozen him into believing that 
he already, by virtue of what he had written so far, took a particular position on an issue, and to 
convince him to take the next step and write that view into law at the next opportunity.  It is considered 
bad form, or unclubbable, to describe such incidents.  What happens at a faculty workshop generally 
stays at a faculty workshop.  But I am not terribly worried in this case about the risk of revealing the 
identity of this scholar.  This description, after all, fits scores of articles aimed at Justice Kennedy, who 
is one of the most flattered judges in the history of the United States Supreme Court.   
60. See Paul Horwitz, The Small and Vast Difference Between Two Op-Eds, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/the-small-and-vast-difference-
between-two-op-eds.html [https://perma.cc/A8H3-RRSE]. 
61. See Martin H. Redish, A Pardon for Arpaio Would Put Trump in Unchartered Territory, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/trump-arpaio-pardon-
arizona-sheriff.html [http://perma.cc/7YMC-9U4B]. 
62. Id. 
63. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional, 
SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/charlottesville_s_monument
s_are_unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/E7W2-ETPK] (discussing Confederate monuments in 
Charlottesville).  I note the fact of my friendship with both authors, and add that I very much admire 
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So far, the lawsuit over Charlottesville’s monuments has 
focused on arcane issues of state law.  But there are larger 
constitutional principles at stake—most importantly, that the 
government is prohibited from conveying messages that 
denigrate or demean racial or religious minorities.  While 
private citizens may engage in hate speech under existing law, 
the government may not demean racial or religious minorities 
without running afoul of the guarantee of equal protection 
contained in the 14th Amendment.  Unlike limitations on hate 
speech, which remain controversial, this rule against racialized 
government speech should enjoy widespread support.64 
My problem with this assertion has little or nothing to do with whether I 
agree or disagree with it as a normative matter.  It lies in two confident little 
words, paraded before an audience of non-specialists and buttressed at the end 
of the piece by that incantatory author’s description, “X is a professor of law.”  
The words are “principles” and “rule.”  I think it is fair to say, and that many or 
most First Amendment specialists would agree, that it is unclear whether there 
is such a principle.  If there is, it is as or more unclear whether and how that 
principle would apply in this or any other concrete case. 
Similarly, the word “rule,” at least in the absence of a prefix like 
“proposed,” carries with it the implication that there clearly is such a rule, and 
that the courts would—or should, if they follow existing law or “principles” 
correctly—agree that it exists and applies in this case.  The phrase “rule against 
racialized government speech”65 is further reinforced by another rhetorical 
device of our new-media age: the hyperlink.  It sets off the words in bold purple 
type against the dull black of the rest of the text.  It suggests to the reader, who 
may or may not bother to click through to the link, that this is not just an 
argument, but a “fact” established by “authority.”  That “authority” turns out to 
 
their work and learn from it regularly.  I do so as part of the standard, albeit quite sincere, emphasis 
that the criticism is not personal and should not be taken as such.  I am not sure this kind of disclaimer 
should be necessary, however.  My criticism is academic and professional and presented with enough 
detail and citation for readers to judge its validity for itself.  Academics should not hesitate to criticize 
each other, albeit in academic fashion and for academic reasons.  Friendship in the academy does not 
require some code of omertá or polite silence, although at least one editor at a respected university 
press once suggested to me that law professors are far less likely than academics in other fields to 
criticize each other’s work.  Certainly political alliances are irrelevant: whether I agree or disagree with 
these writers’ work on this or other occasions (sometimes yes, sometimes no) should be unimportant.  
So are questions of prestige, senior or junior status, or the desire not to offend others for fear of blocking 
one’s own professional advancement, although I admit to being as ambitious as the average law 
professor.   
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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be an excellent law review article by Tebbe, titled Government 
Nonendorsement, that argues for such a rule.66  The article itself acknowledges 
a “widespread” “assumption that the government is free to endorse and 
denigrate secular ideas,” and says the assumption arises “thanks in part to the 
Supreme Court and in part to scholarship on free speech and religious 
freedom.”67  It argues that “that belief is mistaken,” but makes clear that this is 
a claim, not a certainty.68  Tebbe argues that the rule is supported by and 
immanent in current caselaw, but acknowledges that “free speech examples 
[supporting his claim, in court decisions,] are hard[] to find.”69  And, like any 
responsible scholar, he anticipates and addresses potential questions and 
objections, and notes that they include the essential question what limits should 
apply to such a rule, although—in a way that is common in modern legal 
scholarship, as I have suggested above—he treats “the question of limits” as 
“secondary.”70 
No reader of this law review article would fail to understand that Tebbe is 
advancing an argument here, and that this argument has no privileged status 
and does not simply describe uncontroversial current law.  Only the most subtle 
and careful reader of Tebbe and Schwartzman’s op-ed, on the other hand, would 
be able to tell any of this from the op-ed itself. 
Writers of op-eds, when pressed on such points, frequently dismiss them 
with the defense that they only had a limited number of words to work with and 
couldn’t over-complicate the argument for general readers.  Of course, if one 
can’t convey such caveats in the limited space available, there is always another 
option: Don’t publish the op-ed.  In any event, the defense doesn’t apply here.  
The authors could easily and economically have substituted words like 
“argument” or “proposal” for “principle” or “rule.” 
Of course, one can dismiss such things as trivialities or accidents, or 
question how much they matter.  But it is their very commonness, their 
cumulative effect, and the strategic combination of such arguments, with their 
elisions and simplifications, across a range of media and approaches, that makes 
these individual instances significant and disturbing.  And the very fact that 
they are connected and concerted, and that the advocacy appearing outside the 
confines of traditional forums such as law reviews and university press books 
almost always prominently announces and trades on the status and “expert” 
 
66. Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013). 
67. Id. at 649–50. 
68. Id. at 650–51. 
69. Id. at 652. 
70. Id. at 653. 
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authority of the scholar as a scholar, makes it hard to dismiss such concerns on 
the basis that they are really “just” extra-scholarly advocacy or lawyering. 
Again, despite my personal distaste for this model of public or “engaged” 
scholarly activity, I do not argue here for its elimination or its expulsion from 
the category of “scholarship.”  Rather, I ask what the principles of candor and 
integrity require in such cases.  The answers, by this point in my contribution, 
are not surprising. 
The key requirement is that any legal scholar engaging in such activity 
should say so.  Having decided to follow this approach, he should be up-front 
about it.  He can announce early in a law review article that the article is part of 
a larger project of legal advocacy that will include litigation, op-eds, twits, and 
other publicity.  He can say in work aimed at the general public, as Professor 
Redish did so admirably, that he is advancing an argument, not making a 
confident assertion of the law as it stands and as the courts would describe it.71  
He can make clear, in any forum, that he is writing to achieve a particular result, 
not to explore a question disinterestedly.  He can either avoid strategic 
rhetorical choices aimed at enlisting others rather than persuading them through 
pure intellectual argument, or openly acknowledge these choices for what they 
are.  If his work is part of a larger suite of collaborative advocacy or activism, 
he can say so.  There is nothing wrong with saying, in the acknowledgment or 
“asterisk” footnote of a law review article, “This article was delivered with 
funding from [or at a conference hosted and whose expenses were paid for by] 
the Center for So-and-So, which advocates for [insert issue and outcome here].”  
The Center for So-and-So might not like it, but that is the Center’s problem, not 
anyone else’s.  He can say, when drafting an amicus brief or scholars’ letter, 
that the signatories are not all experts on the issue, or that they are experts on, 
say, constitutional law in general, but not on the particular question before the 
court.  When writing an article that deliberately limits its scope, if the reason 
for limiting the scope of the discussion is that the unaddressed questions might 
hurt the article’s chances of persuading judges or might give ammunition to his 
opponents, he can say just that. 
As with the other forms of scholarship discussed above, employing candor 
and integrity in this fashion will have beneficial effects.  The most important 
effect is to send accurate signals to readers, enabling them to evaluate the 
work—whether in a scholarly forum or elsewhere—with adequate knowledge 
of its goals and limits.  An amicus brief written by a group of self-described 
non-experts will stand or fall on the merits of the arguments (or whatever other 
determinants go into the judge’s decision), not on any purported expert 
authority.  A reader of an op-ed who is told that the argument being made is an 
 
71. Redish, supra note 62. 
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argument about what the law ought to be, that it is novel, or that few if any 
courts have accepted such arguments so far, may still agree with the argument, 
but will not think she is being given incontrovertible facts, or that anyone who 
disagrees with the argument must be callously and dishonestly ignoring reality.  
The reader will be aware that she is being sold an argument, that this sale is 
being pursued across multiple “platforms,” and that the goal of this concerted 
effort is to influence both the courts and the reasonably well-educated laity (and 
then some, if one includes Twitter), and to use a wide toolkit of rhetorical and 
other devices to “maximize the real life impact [of such interventions] on 
current issues.”72  The reader has nothing to lose but her credulity and 
innocence. 
And the writer?  It seems to me he has nothing to lose that he is entitled to 
complain about losing.  A frequent response I have received to objections to 
lack of candor and integrity in publicly oriented scholarship, and the use of 
scholarly credentials to buttress arguments aimed at the public, is that no 
disclosures are required because, in effect, everyone already understands the 
game.  If that is the case, then the kinds of disclosures I recommend can hardly 
undermine the work.  The problem is one of mere redundancy—that such 
disclosures are unnecessary.  Redundancy seems a pretty small price to pay to 
ensure the integrity of the scholarly enterprise and guard against taking in more 
naïve or vulnerable non-specialist readers. 
The other possibility, of course, is that everyone does not already 
understand the game.  Or the problem may be that it is not always clear when a 
piece of scholarship or some other piece of writing is a disinterested analysis of 
an issue and when it is part of a larger project of advocacy, and that the scholar-
advocate relies on and takes advantage of the boost in authority and 
persuasiveness that results from that uncertainty.  A scholars’ letter, for 
instance, or an amicus brief signed by scholars in a particular field, relies on the 
ostensible special expertise that these scholars bring to the question on which 
they are opining.  And that presumption of expertise comes from more 
traditionalist “academicized” work.  If the letter-writers lack expertise on the 
issue, or are not drawing on that expertise in writing or signing the letter or 
brief, or do not in fact agree as experts with all of the content of the brief or 
letter, they are trading on that authority for other ends and with no fair basis for 
doing so.  It is true that if letters or briefs of this sort began with the caveat that 
they were not prepared by the signers, or involve assertions on matters on which 
the signers are not experts, or do not necessarily agree, they would be taken 
much less seriously—if not by judges, who may already not take them 
 
72. Katyal, supra note 46, at 60. 
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seriously, then by law clerks, journalists, and the public.  That would be a good 
thing. 
In short, I do not seek to reject all such work as “non-scholarship” or rule it 
out of bounds altogether.  But it does seem to me that if it were undertaken with 
candor and integrity—if its producers told its consumers what they were up to 
and why—the political effectiveness of this kind of work would be significantly 
undermined.  And it is hard for me to see this as anything other than a benefit, 
both for scholarship and for democratic dialogue. 
There is a final sting in the tail of all this.  The exercise of reflection on the 
goals of one’s work, and candor about those goals and how they are directing 
or limiting one’s work, may lead the scholar to reconsider her vocation.  It may, 
as the current phrase runs these days, require the “engaged” legal scholar to 
“check her own privilege.”  And there is no doubt that a tenure-track or tenured 
position at an American law school is an enormous privilege.  It is not merely 
a convenient—even luxurious—place from which to do other kinds of work.  It 
provides the luxurious gloss of authority.  But it does not do so for purposes of 
exploiting that authority—even for good ends.  To the extent that the engaged 
scholar writes, among other things, scholarship that meets all the standard 
ethical and professional criteria for scholarship, then the academic perch is 
justified.  To the extent that her additional, “engaged” work makes explicit its 
highly partial goals, its interested perspective, the source of its funding, its 
reliance on rhetorical tools of persuasion rather than meaningful expertise, and 
so on, at least that work will not trade unfairly on the ostensible authority of the 
academic office.  But if publicly providing this laundry list of caveats and 
disclosures is the price of undertaking “engaged” articles, blog posts, Twitter 
feeds, op-eds, amicus briefs, and the like while remaining in the academy, the 
“engaged” or public scholar may decide that his or her time would be better 
spent leaving the academy and focusing on such work directly.  There are many 
places to do so: as a public-interest litigator or private lawyer, at a think tank 
rather than at a university, as an independent public intellectual rather than a 
tenured academic, as a political candidate or office-holder or government 
lawyer, and so on.  Tenure is not a life sentence, after all.  And there are plenty 
of would-be scholars who would be happy to fill such positions, and either use 
them for only their original intended use, or make it quite clear when they are 
doing anything different from that. 
There is one more interesting possibility: Scholars who, because of 
requirements of candor and integrity, are unable to engage in the same kinds of 
public interventions they engage in today, could write exactly the same 
things—in their non-academic capacity.  No rule says that scholars cannot act 
as politically involved and engaged citizens.  A professor at an elite law school 
who wants to intervene on a public issue, and who is not bringing real expertise 
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to the question or not using that expertise properly as an academic, can write an 
op-ed that omits any mention of his or her academic affiliation.  Law professors 
who want to sign amicus briefs on issues on which they have not done the 
research or to which they bring no real expertise can similarly sign those briefs 
as interested individuals, again omitting any mention of the universities that 
employ them.  More academics should be politically and civically involved and 
engaged.  Many more of them should do so without using their titles or 
letterheads.  If they find that unthinkable, it is possible that it is time for them 
to reconsider their vocation. 
In fact, none of this is truly unthinkable.  To take an imperfect example, 
consider Professor Michelle Alexander.  A former litigator and professor at the 
Stanford and Ohio State law schools,73 Alexander achieved much broader fame 
for her book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness.74  In the process of speaking about these issues, Alexander 
writes, she became convinced that the kinds of issues she was concerned with, 
and the ways she wanted to address them, did not belong in a law school or in 
legal academic work.75  “At its core,” she wrote, “America’s journey from 
slavery to Jim Crow to mass incarceration raises profound moral and spiritual 
questions about who we are, individually and collectively, who we aim to 
become, and what we are willing to do now.  I have found that these questions 
are generally not asked or answered in law schools . . . .”76 
So she quit.  Or, to be more accurate and less dramatic, she moved.  Having 
decided to “shift[] [her] own focus from questions of law to questions of 
justice,” Alexander decided that a better home for such studies would be a 
visiting professorship at Union Theological Seminary.77  That strikes me as 
showing an extraordinary sense of candor, integrity, and professional 
responsibility to both callings—her new one and her old one.  More legal 
scholars should emulate her.   
 
 
73. For Professor Alexander’s professional biography, see Michelle Alexander, UNION 
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, https://utsnyc.edu/faculty/michelle-alexander/ [https://perma.cc/CBT3-
7ZF9] (last visited May 2, 2018).   
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